By
Dr. Michele Mosca, Dr. Marco Piani
November 19, 2026

Chief risk officers don’t wait until a risk is certain before managing it. They assess for likelihood, potential impact and response time and respond accordingly, whether a risk is financial, operational or cyber.
Quantum threats call for the same discipline — for risk-based planning ‘sized’ to the fact that migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) takes years.
The challenge is that the time required for PQC migration may be longer than we have before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) arrives capable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography.
That is the central message of our November 2026 Quantum Briefing published in collaboration with the Global Risk Institute (GRI). Organizations that wait for a precise date may find the time remaining shorter than what’s needed to complete the work ahead. Three recent developments explain why.
AI is helping researchers tackle hard problems in quantum computing, including hardware operations. At the same time, AI-assisted classical cryptanalysis has the ability to uncover vulnerabilities — as it did with HAWK, a candidate post-quantum signature scheme. That discovery led to HAWK’s withdrawal from the standardization process. (The HAWK finding left NIST-standardized algorithms untouched, so the case for deploying them stands.)
AI-assisted analysis has also contributed to findings affecting Classic McEliece, which ISO standardized in June 2026. In September 2026, Germany’s BSI advised against using Classic McEliece in new developments.
Both the HAWK case and Classic McEliece show public scrutiny working as designed, with a lesson for every migration program: new cryptography may bring surprises. The goal of migration is a resilient cryptographic posture built on agility, defense in depth and diversity, rather than a one-time algorithm swap.
CRQCs will be specialized, sufficiently powerful fault-tolerant machines. Quantum computer developers and governments are investing heavily in fault-tolerant quantum computing, targeting the obstacles that matter most: scalability, manufacturing, error correction and system integration.
In September 2026, the Quantum Subcommittee of the U.S.Department of Energy’s Office of Science Advisory Committee described quantum computing as approaching an “inflection point” and proposed a roadmap toward scientifically useful, error-corrected quantum computing by 2028. While that is a research target rather than a forecast of when cryptography could be broken,it signals concentrated effort on the same error-correction and scaling milestones that lie on the path to a CRQC.
Published resource estimates point the same way. A recentIonQ study estimates that a future fault-tolerant trapped-ion machine with roughly 19,400 physical qubits could recover a private key on a widely used elliptic curve in about 26 days per attempt. The figure rests on IonQ’s assumptions about its own future hardware, and no existing machine can run the attack. Even so, it shows why long-lived signing keys for certificates, firmware and software need protection early.
Under Executive Order 14412, federal agencies must migrate high-value assets and high-impact systems to PQC key establishment by December 31, 2030, and to PQC digital signatures by December 31, 2031. National security systems follow a separate track under NSA guidance, but these dates offer a useful planning benchmark for private organizations. Governments elsewhere are setting hard dates, too — most between 2030 and 2035.
The deeper risk in waiting is operational. A future CRQC could compromise the quantum-vulnerable digital signatures that authenticate payments, software and identities, undermining the trust that critical systems depend on.
Organizations that wait for the threat to materialize and then scramble face a second danger: rushed, incomplete or improper migrations that introduce vulnerabilities exploitable even by classical computers. In highly interconnected sectors like finance, a failure in one critical system or dependency can disrupt operations well beyond it. Data that must stay confidential for years adds further exposure, since encrypted traffic collected today could be decrypted later.
Treat quantum risk like any other material risk. Assess readiness across governance, suppliers and workforce. Identify where a cryptographic failure would have the greatest impact and prioritize migrations accordingly, starting with critical authentication systems and long-lived sensitive data, and accelerate where risk or system complexity warrants.
It is also important to revisit business continuity and disaster recovery plans and assess whether they account for outages caused by AI-enabled attackers exploiting a cryptographic zero-day. Few, if any, were built with such a scenario in mind.
For the full analysis, download the November 2026 Quantum Briefing here. To discuss where your organization’s critical cryptographic dependencies sit, and the solutions available today to build resilience around them, get in touch with our team.